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MORTGAGING THE AMERICAN DREAM:   
THE MISPLACED ROLE OF ACCREDITATION IN 
THE FEDERAL STUDENT LOAN SYSTEM 
Kathleen Negri* 
 
In 2013, outstanding student loan balances in the United States exceeded 
$994 billion.  This growing volume of student debt has had far-reaching 
consequences for both individual borrowers and society as a whole.  In 
many ways, the federal student loan program, available to students under 
the Higher Education Act (HEA), has achieved its goal of making higher 
education more accessible.  Undergraduate college enrollment increased 
from 10.5 million students in 1980 to 17.6 million students in 2009.  Despite 
the benefit of increased enrollment, however, the federal loan program has 
been criticized for increasing student loan debt and contributing to the 
“student loan crisis.”  This student loan crisis threatens to undermine the 
purpose of the HEA by making higher education less accessible to 
Americans. 
Higher education institutions must be accredited to be eligible for Title 
IV federal funding under the HEA.  The federal government relies on 
accreditation to assess the academic quality of the institutions and 
programs to which it provides federal funding.  This federal funding-
accreditation relationship, riddled with conflicts of interest, has been 
ineffective in regulating student loans, contributing to the mounting student 
loan debt.  This Note examines the relationship between the federal student 
loan system and accrediting bodies through economic theory, ultimately 
arguing that the HEA be amended to decouple accreditation and federal 
student loans. 
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“Education is the key to opportunity in our society, and equality of 
educational opportunity must be the birthright of every citizen.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
Throughout history, education has been regarded as an integral part of the 
American dream, an individual’s pathway to opportunity and success.2  
When President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Higher Education Act of 
19653 (HEA), providing federal financial assistance to postsecondary 
students, he was hoping to reduce financial barriers and provide equal 
access to higher education.4 
Since 1965, however, changing political, social, and economic factors 
have turned this American dream into American debt.  From 2004 to 2012, 
the number of student borrowers increased 70 percent.5  In 2013, 
outstanding student loan balances in the United States exceeded $994 
billion.6  Students, the government, and, ultimately, taxpayers, shoulder the 
burden of this student loan crisis.7 
Under the HEA, higher education institutions must be accredited by a 
recognized accrediting body in order to be eligible for these Title IV federal 
 
 1. Presidential Statement Announcing the Calling of a White House Conference on 
Education, 2 PUB. PAPERS 291 (June 1, 1965). 
 2. See generally Joseph E. Stiglitz, Student Debt and the Crushing of the American 
Dream, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2013, 9:09 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/
05/12/student-debt-and-the-crushing-of-the-american-dream/?_php=true&_type=blogs&
_r=0. 
 3. Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1001 to 1161aa-1). 
 4. See Roger Roots, The Student Loan Debt Crisis:  A Lesson in Unintended 
Consequences, 29 SW. U. L. REV. 501, 505 (2000). 
 5. See DONGHOON LEE, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., HOUSEHOLD DEBT AND CREDIT:  
STUDENT DEBT 7 (2013), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/
mediaadvisory/2013/Lee022813.pdf. 
 6. RESEARCH & STATISTICS GRP. MICROECONOMIC STUDIES, FED. RESERVE BANK OF 
N.Y., QUARTERLY REPORT ON HOUSEHOLD DEBT AND CREDIT 1 (2013), available at 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/national_economy/householdcredit/DistrictReport_Q22
013.pdf [hereinafter RESEARCH & STATISTICS GRP.]. 
 7. See infra Part I.A.3. 
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funds, earning accreditation the role of the gatekeeper of federal funds.8  
The rise of the student loan crisis has led to increased scrutiny of the 
accreditation industry.  This federal funding-accreditation relationship, 
riddled with conflicts of interest, has been ineffective in regulating student 
loans, contributing to the mounting student loan debt.9 
This Note examines the relationship between the federal student loan 
program and accrediting bodies through economic theory.  Part I of this 
Note describes the institutional frameworks of the federal funding and 
accreditation industries and how these two mismatched programs interact.10  
Part II of this Note introduces two economic concepts at the core of the 
dilemma:  agency theory and principles of valuation.11  Part III discusses 
the relationship between federal funding and accreditation through the lens 
of agency theory, revealing the conflicting incentives of the government 
and accreditors.12  Part III also considers proposed solutions to the 
principal-agent problem, including decoupling the accreditation and federal 
student loan programs.13  Finally, Part IV of this Note discusses the failure 
of government regulation of accreditation, in part because these regulations 
require a definition of “quality” education.14  Part IV concludes that 
decoupling accreditation and federal student loans is therefore a necessary 
step to the solvency and survival of the federal student loan program.15 
I.  BACKGROUND ON THE STUDENT LOAN CRISIS 
Part I of this Note discusses the background and institutional frameworks 
that have led to the current student loan crisis.  Part I.A discusses the 
federal student loan system and the impact of rising levels of student loan 
debt on individual borrowers and the U.S. economy.  Part I.B then discusses 
the structure of the accreditation industry and this industry’s role as a 
gatekeeper for federal student loans. 
A.  The Rise of Student Loans 
In recent years, an increasing number of Americans have turned to 
student loans to finance higher education.16  The level of student loan debt 
nearly tripled between 2004 and 2012.17  As of June 30, 2013, outstanding 
student loan balances in the United States reached a historical high of $994 
billion.18  This growing debt volume, coupled with increasing delinquency 
 
 8. See infra Part I.B. 
 9. See infra Part III.A–B. 
 10. See infra Part I. 
 11. See infra Part II. 
 12. See infra Part III. 
 13. See infra Part III. 
 14. See infra Part IV. 
 15. See infra Part IV. 
 16. See LEE, supra note 5, at 2. 
 17. Id. at 9. 
 18. See RESEARCH & STATISTICS GRP., supra note 6. 
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rates, has led to a debate about how to manage—and potentially reform—
student loan programs. 
This section first discusses how federal student loan programs operate.  It 
then briefly reviews the private market for student loans.  Finally, it 
addresses the student loan crisis and the effect this mounting debt has on 
both individual student borrowers and the national economy. 
1.  Federal Student Loan Programs 
Students seeking to finance higher education through loans can look to 
either government programs or private lenders, but government loans 
dominate the student loan market.19  The HEA, enacted in 1965 to increase 
access to higher education for all Americans, created the current federal 
student loan system.20  This section discusses (a) the structure of the federal 
loan system and (b) the institutional eligibility rules that regulate which 
higher education institutions can receive this federal funding. 
a.  The Structure of Federal Loan Programs 
When the HEA was initially enacted in 1965, Title IV provided for fixed-
interest, government-subsidized loans, that were issued through banking 
institutions and backed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. government.21  
The HEA has been reauthorized nine times since its inception—most 
recently in 2008—and is set for renewal in 2014.22 
In 2010, the Student Aid and Fiscal Responsibility Act (SAFRA), part of 
the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act, restructured the federal 
student loan program.23  Under this new structure, the government is now 
the sole originator of Title IV federal student loans, eliminating the 
middleman role of banks in the loan process.24  The current federal student 
loan regime promotes access to higher education by providing better loan 
 
 19. See infra Part I.A.2 (discussing the private loan market). 
 20. See Roots, supra note 4, at 504–05 (noting that while loans were offered as early as 
1958, the HEA created the modern federal loan system); see also Matthew A. McGuire, 
Note, Subprime Education:  For-Profit Colleges and the Problem with Title IV Federal 
Student Aid, 62 DUKE L.J. 119, 140 (2012). 
 21. See William S. Howard, The Student Loan Crisis and the Race to Princeton Law 
School, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 485, 495 (2011). 
 22. See What You Need To Know About Reauthorization, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Sept. 
19, 2013), http://chronicle.com/article/What-You-Need-to-Know-About/141697/.  The 2008 
reauthorization of the HEA was called the Higher Education Opportunity Act (“HEOA”). 
See Higher Education Opportunity Act—2008, U.S. DEP’T EDUC. (June 25, 2010), 
http://www2.ed.gov/policy/highered/leg/hea08/index.html.  For the purposes of this Note, 
HEA refers to the Higher Education Act as amended. 
 23. Student Aid and Fiscal Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 
(2010). 
 24. See Howard, supra note 21, at 485.  Before SAFRA, the government used banking 
institutions as middlemen and would subsidize and guarantee the loans these banks issued. 
Id.  The Department of Education seeks to save $68 billion dollars over the next eleven years 
by eliminating the middleman banks. See Statement by President Barack Obama Upon 
Signing H.R.4872 (Mar. 30, 2010), 2010 U.S.C.C.A.N. S12, S15. 
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terms than students would receive in the private loan market.25  Loans are 
issued as part of the Federal Direct Loan Program and the Federal Perkins 
Loan Program.26 
Under the Direct Loan Program, the U.S. Department of Education 
(USDE) issues loans directly to higher education institutions that borrowers 
attend.27  There are two major sources of direct loans:  Stafford Loans and 
Parents Loans for Undergraduates (PLUS).28 
There are three types of Stafford Loans available to students.  First, 
unsubsidized Stafford Loans are available for undergraduate and graduate 
students.29  Second, subsidized Stafford Loans are available for 
undergraduate students who can demonstrate financial need.30  These 
subsidized loans have lower borrowing limits and interest rates are set at a 
spread above the ten-year Treasury note rate.31  Third, graduate Stafford 
Loans have a higher borrowing limit with interest rates slightly higher than 
the undergraduate subsidized Stafford Loan.32 
The second category of Direct Loans is the PLUS Loan.33  Parents of 
undergraduates can borrow up to the cost of student attendance—including 
tuition, housing, and expenses—through a PLUS Loan.34  Interest rates are 
higher for PLUS Loans, and parents must pass a credit check to qualify.35  
Graduate PLUS Loans are available for graduate students who exhaust their 
financing options under Stafford Loans.36 
In addition to Stafford and PLUS Direct Loans, the government operates 
the Perkins Loan Program.  While the government lends money under 
direct loans, schools are the lenders for Perkins Loans.37  The government 
provides schools with a level of funding, which participating schools must 
 
 25. See Federal Student Loan Programs—Overview, NEW AM. FOUND. (Oct. 18, 2013 
4:47 PM), http://febp.newamerica.net/background-analysis/federal-student-loan-programs-
overview. 
 26. See Federal Student Loan Programs, U.S. DEP’T EDUC. (June 2013), 
http://studentaid.ed.gov/sites/default/files/federal-loan-programs.pdf. 
 27. See id.  Though the government issues loans directly under this program, the 
government hires private companies to process disbursements and loan repayments. See 
Loan Servicers, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., http://studentaid.ed.gov/repay-loans/understand/
servicers#who-is-my-loan-servicer (last visited Feb. 24, 2014). 
 28. See Federal Student Loan Programs—Overview, supra note 25.  In addition to 
Stafford and PLUS Loans, the government offers Direct Consolidation Loans that allow 
borrowers to consolidate multiple federal loans into a single loan with a single interest rate. 
Id. 
 29. See Federal Student Loan Programs—Overview, supra note 25. 
 30. See id.  The amount a student can borrow for subsidized Stafford Loans depends on 
the student’s classification as “dependent” or “independent.” Id.  Independent students are 
those who:  are over 24 years old; have served in the military; are married; have legal 
dependents; were an orphan until eighteen years old; or have unusual circumstances. Id.  
These independent students have higher borrowing limits. Id. 
 31. See id. 
 32. See id. 
 33. See id. 
 34. See id. 
 35. See id. 
 36. See id. 
 37. See Federal Student Loan Programs, supra note 26. 
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match and loan to students.38  This program provides low-interest loans for 
students with “exceptional financial need.”39 
Students borrowing through the Direct Loan or Perkins Program have 
several repayment options.  The standard repayment scheme is a ten-year, 
monthly repayment plan.40  Students have the option of extending their 
repayment schedules if they have higher student loan balances.41  For those 
borrowers who exceed a certain debt-to-income ratio, SAFRA introduced 
income-based repayment, which sets monthly payments at 10 percent of 
income and forgives unpaid loans after between twenty and twenty-five 
years (depending on the type of loan).42 
b.  Institutional Eligibility Rules 
Students are given access to the federal student loan programs described 
above with few prerequisites.  Loans are available to students who typically 
have “little or no credit or employment history” without regard for field of 
study or academic performance.43  While some programs require a showing 
of financial need, these programs exist to make loans readily available and 
to encourage financing of higher education.44  Instead of assessing students’ 
ability to repay loans, the USDE attempts to regulate the higher education 
institutions that receive the Title IV funding.45 
There are two major requirements for all higher education institutions 
and additional requirements for for-profit institutions.  First, higher 
education institutions must be accredited by a USDE-recognized accrediting 
body to receive Title IV funding.46  Second, the higher education institution 
cannot have an unacceptably high cohort default rate on existing Title IV 
loans.47 
For-profit institutions are subject to additional requirements, because 
these schools are criticized for having a higher percentage of students 
relying on government loans and defaulting on these loans.48  The 90/10 
 
 38. See Federal Student Loan Programs—Overview, supra note 25. 
 39. See Perkins Loans, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., http://studentaid.ed.gov/types/loans/perkins 
(last visited Feb. 24, 2014). 
 40. See Federal Student Loan Programs—Overview, supra note 25. 
 41. See id. 
 42. See id. 
 43. See id. 
 44. See id. 
 45. See McGuire, supra note 20, at 145–49 (discussing institutional eligibility rules 
including cohort default rates and the “90/10 rule”). 
 46. See infra Part I.B (discussing the accreditation process). 
 47. See 34 C.F.R. § 668.206 (2013).  A cohort default rate measures the number of 
students who default on student loans during a particular period compared to the number of 
students who began repayment during that period. See id. § 668.183 (defining and specifying 
how institutions are to calculate cohort default rates).  Borrowers are in default if they are 
270 to 360 days behind payment within the first three years of repayment, depending on the 
type of loan. See id. 
 48. For an evaluation of the for-profit education industry, see generally DANIEL L. 
BENNETT, ADAM R. LUCCHESI & RICHARD K. VEDDER, CTR. FOR COLL. AFFORDABILITY & 
PRODUCTIVITY, FOR-PROFIT HIGHER EDUCATION:  GROWTH, INNOVATION AND REGULATION 
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rule requires for-profit institutions to receive at least 10 percent of their 
revenue from non–Title IV sources.49  Additionally, these schools must 
offer programs that prepare students for “gainful employment in a 
recognized occupation.”50 
In 2011, the USDE proposed additional institutional eligibility 
requirements that would revise the definition of “gainful employment.”51  
The USDE promulgated regulations redefining gainful employment 
standards based on student outcomes, including loan repayment and debt-
to-earnings ratios.52  The D.C. Circuit held these rules to be arbitrary and 
capricious.53  As of the publication of this Note, the USDE is redrafting 
similar rules.54 
2.  The Private Loan Market 
Though federal student loans are the primary form of student aid, 
students can also obtain private loans from banking institutions.55  There 
are an estimated $150 billion of private student loans outstanding, 
approximately one-fifth of the federal loan volume.56  Prior to the 2008 
 
(2010), available at http://www.centerforcollegeaffordability.org/uploads/ForProfit_
HigherEd.pdf.  Critics of the for-profit industry argue that these institutions encourage 
“higher debt burdens and default rates.” See Jean Braucher, Mortgaging Human Capital:  
Federally Funded Subprime Higher Education, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 439, 441 (2012).  
Supporters, on the other hand, argue that for-profit institutions offer “innovative practices” 
that could benefit higher education. See Ben Wildavsky, For-Profit Lessons for All, INSIDE 
HIGHER ED (Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.insidehighered.com/views/2012/03/01/essay-what-
nonprofit-higher-ed-can-learn-profit-sector.  This Note addresses for-profit and nonprofit 
educational institutions alike. 
 49. See Braucher, supra note 48, at 455–56. 
 50. 20 U.S.C. § 1002(b)(1)(A) (2012).  These institutional eligibility requirements are 
meant to ensure that students receiving federal loans attend quality institutions that prepare 
these students for careers and allow them to repay their loans; however, the efficacy of these 
requirements is often questioned.  For example, cohort default rate rules are often criticized 
for being inaccurate because the default rate focuses on a narrow timeframe. See McGuire, 
supra note 20, at 145–46 (“[The] calculations are far too narrow to have any impact . . . .”).  
Additionally, almost half of student loans are in grace periods or deferment, and are 
therefore not included in cohort default rates. See RESEARCH & STATISTICS GRP., supra note 
6, at 1 n.2.  Similarly, the 90/10 rule is easily satisfied because other forms of federal 
funding are calculated as part of the 10 percent, including veterans loans and training grants. 
See Braucher, supra note 48, at 455–56.  This Note focuses on the ineffectiveness of 
accreditation as a gatekeeper to federal loans. See infra Part I.B. 
 51. See McGuire, supra note 20, at 127–28. 
 52. See id. 
 53. See Ass’n of Private Colls. & Univs. v. Duncan, 870 F. Supp. 2d 133, 137 (D.C. Cir. 
2012). 
 54. See Negotiated Rulemaking 2013–2014—Gainful Employment, U.S. DEP’T EDUC. 
(Dec. 16, 2013), http://www2.ed.gov/policy/highered/reg/hearulemaking/2012/
gainfulemployment.html (discussing the scheduling of negotiated rulemaking sessions to 
resume discussions of the proposed gainful employment rules). 
 55. This Note focuses on federal loan programs; however, the private student loan 
market supplements the public market.  For a more in-depth discussion of the private loan 
market, see CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, PRIVATE STUDENT LOANS (2012), available at 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201207_cfpb_Reports_Private-Student-Loans.pdf. 
 56. Id. at 3. 
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financial crisis, this private market was highly unregulated.57  Private loans 
are riskier for students as they tend to have higher variable interest rates and 
lack repayment flexibility.58  Financial institutions packaged and sold 
Student Loan Asset-Backed Securities (SLABS), similar to mortgage-
backed securities, without supervision.59 
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street and Consumer Protection Act60 (Dodd-
Frank) began a new era of regulation of the private student loan market in 
response to the packaging of these SLABS.61  Dodd-Frank tightened 
lending standards for banks.62 These banks, finding it more difficult to sell 
student loans in this regulated market, are offering fewer loans or exiting 
the student loan market entirely.63 
3.  The Student Loan Crisis 
The federal student loan program has, in many ways, achieved its goal of 
making higher education more accessible.  Undergraduate college 
enrollment increased from 10.5 million students in 1980 to 17.6 million 
students in 2009.64  Many argue that this increased enrollment benefited 
American society by creating a more qualified, higher-paid workforce, 
ultimately improving the quality of life.65 
Despite the benefits of the federal loan system, the program has been 
criticized for increasing student loan debt and contributing to the “student 
loan crisis.”66  Student loan debt—the only category of household debt that 
 
 57. See id. at 28. 
 58. See id. at 3. 
 59. See id. at 17–18, 22–23. 
 60. Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
7, 12, 15, 18, 22, 31, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 61. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 55, at 68. 
 62. See id. at 3–4. 
 63. See, e.g., Dan Fitzpatrick & Robin Sidel, J.P. Morgan To End Student-Loan 
Business, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 5, 2013, 7:51 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424127887323623304579057091084420988 (discussing J.P. Morgan Chase’s 
departure from the student loan business). 
 64. Christopher Avery & Sarah Turner, Student Loans:  Do College Students Borrow 
Too Much—Or Not Enough?, 26 J. ECON. PERSP. 165, 167 (2012). 
 65. See C. Aaron LeMay & Robert C. Cloud, Student Debt and the Future of Higher 
Education, 34 J.C. & U.L. 79, 101 (2007) (noting that federal loans allow millions of 
Americans to “enjoy a quality of life that would have been impossible without an 
education”); Bradley J.B. Toben & Carolyn P. Osolinik, Nonprofit Student Lenders and Risk 
Retention:  How the Dodd-Frank Act Threatens Students’ Access to Higher Education and 
the Viability of Nonprofit Student Lenders, 64 BAYLOR L. REV. 158, 165–66 (2012) 
(discussing the benefits of postsecondary education, including reduced reliance on public 
assistance, healthier lifestyles, and reduced crime rates).  This increased quality of life is 
often measured by the income premium that higher education graduates earn. See generally 
ANTHONY P. CARNEVALE ET AL., GEORGETOWN UNIV. CTR. ON EDUC. AND THE WORKFORCE, 
THE COLLEGE PAYOFF:  EDUCATION, OCCUPATIONS, LIFETIME EARNINGS (2011), available at 
http://www9.georgetown.edu/grad/gppi/hpi/cew/pdfs/collegepayoff-complete.pdf 
(concluding that workers with bachelor’s degrees on average earn 84 percent more over a 
lifetime than those with only high school diplomas). 
 66. There is significant debate about whether the exponential increase in student loan 
debt has fueled a higher education “bubble.” Compare Michael C. Macchiarola & Arun 
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rose during the Great Recession—is second in volume only to mortgage 
debt.67  The number of borrowers and the average balance per borrower 
each increased 70 percent between 2004 and 2012.68 
This high volume of lending propels an increase in tuition costs, 
furthering the need for student loans in an unending cycle.69  Schools, 
knowing that the government will continue to fund student loans, raise 
tuition to “capture the federal money in circulation.”70  Many criticize the 
federal student loan program for contributing to the problem that it seeks to 
solve:  the unaffordability of higher education.71 
The high volume of student debt and the federal student loan system have 
far-reaching consequences for both individual borrowers and society as a 
whole.  The program has resulted in (1) high default rates on loans, 
(2) reduced mobility of students after graduation, and (3) a hindrance of 
economic growth. 
First, default rates have risen with the level of student debt.72  Students 
defaulting on loans are faced with substantial fees and may have their 
wages garnished.73  Defaults on student loans tarnish a borrower’s credit 
score, lowering the student’s ability to purchase a home or car in the 
 
Abraham, Options for Student Borrowers:  A Derivatives-Based Proposal To Protect 
Students and Control Debt-Fueled Inflation in the Higher Education Market, 20 CORNELL 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 67, 67 (2010) (arguing that the student loan markets are showing the 
“hallmarks of a bubble”), and Andrew Woodman, The Student Loan Bubble:  How the 
Mortgage Crisis Can Inform the Bankruptcy Courts, 6 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 179, 186–91 
(2013) (describing the creation of the student loan bubble), with Christopher Matthews, Stop 
Calling Student Loans a “Bubble”!, TIME (Mar. 7, 2013), http://business.time.com/2013/03/
07/viewpoint-stop-calling-student-loans-a-bubble/ (accusing Americans of having “[b]ubble-
phobia”), and Jordan Weissman, No, the Student Loan Crisis Is Not a Bubble, ATLANTIC 
(Sept. 6, 2013 10:28 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/09/no-the-
student-loan-crisis-is-not-a-bubble/279398/ (“[I]t’s not helpful to think of student lending . . . 
in terms of bubbles at all.”).  For the purposes of this Note, the rise in student debt is referred 
to only as a student loan “crisis.” 
 67. See LEE, supra note 5, at 5. 
 68. Id. at 9. 
 69. See Roots, supra note 4, at 506–08 (discussing federal aid as a factor contributing to 
rising tuition). 
 70. Id. 
 71. William Bennett, the secretary of education during the Reagan Administration, 
developed the theory that financial aid encourages colleges to raise tuition, now known as 
the “Bennett Theory.” See William J. Bennett, Our Greedy Colleges, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 
1987, at A31 (“[I]ncreases in financial aid . . . have enabled colleges and universities blithely 
to raise their tuitions, confident that Federal loan subsidies would help cushion the 
increase.”); see also Macchiarola & Abraham, supra note 66, at 71 (“[G]overnment efforts at 
‘access’ have spurred a dramatic increase in the cost of education.”); Stephanie Riegg Cellini 
& Claudia Goldin, Does Federal Student Aid Raise Tuition?  New Evidence on For-Profit 
Colleges 2–3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17827, 2012) (finding 
that for-profit institutions with Title IV funding have higher tuitions, and Title IV–funded 
programs within institutions have higher tuitions than programs within the same institution 
that are not funded by Title IV). 
 72. The national cohort default rate steadily increased from 6.7 percent in 2007 to 10 
percent in 2011. See Federal Student Loan Default Rates, NEW AM. FOUND. (Nov. 21, 2013, 
9:46 PM), http://febp.newamerica.net/background-analysis/federal-student-loan-default-
rates. 
 73. See Braucher, supra note 48, at 476. 
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future.74  The government and taxpayers ultimately bear the burden of this 
default both because the government is not repaid and because defaulting 
borrowers are more reliant on public assistance in the future.75 
Second, even if students do not default on their federal loans, high levels 
of indebtedness reduce students’ mobility after graduation.76  Students who 
chose higher education to expand their opportunities are finding themselves 
with limited options.77  Those with high debt burdens must seek 
employment that compensates them to repay their debts, deterring them 
from less lucrative careers.78  There is also a concern that this debt crisis is 
increasing income disparities, creating a “two-tiered” education system that 
distinguishes between those with loans and those without loans.79 
Finally, the student loan crisis could hinder the growth of the U.S. 
economy.80  Students and families burdened with high levels of student 
loan debt may refrain from investing in homes, taking out loans for 
businesses, or purchasing other consumer goods.81  Reduced levels of 
consumption and investment slow economic growth, particularly as the 
economy continues to recover from the Great Recession.82 
The student loan crisis ultimately threatens to undermine the purpose of 
the HEA by making higher education less accessible to Americans.  
Students are faced with higher tuition costs and mounting debt, which leads 
to default, immobility, and stagnant economic growth.83  The government 
similarly increases its debt burdens as the number of loan defaults rises.84  
These effects of a student loan debt crisis have sparked debate about if, and 
 
 74. See id. (citing Program Integrity:  Gainful Employment—Debt Measures, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 34,386, 34,387 (June 13, 2011) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 668)); see also Anne 
Marie Chaker, Students Borrow More Than Ever for College, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 2009, at 
D1 (reporting that, in a 2006 survey of 1,508 college graduates under age thirty-five, student 
loans forced 44 percent of those graduates to postpone purchasing a house and 28 percent to 
delay having children).  Student loans have these long-term effects in part because they are 
not dischargeable in bankruptcy absent a showing of undue hardship, an incredibly high 
standard that few students can meet. See Braucher, supra note 48, at 473 (noting that the 
undue hardship standard is a “life sentence”). 
 75. See Roots, supra note 4, at 509–10 (“[S]tudent loan defaults cost the U.S. Treasury 
billions of dollars per year.”); see also Woodman, supra note 66, at 181 (describing the 
Treasury as “provid[ing] a backstop in the case of default”). 
 76. See Roots, supra note 4, at 521–22 (discussing postgraduate limitations). 
 77. See id. 
 78. See id.; see also Clive R. Belfield, Student Loans and Repayment Rates:  The Role of 
For-Profit Colleges, 54 RES. HIGHER EDUC. 1, 2 (2013) (discussing how debt influences 
labor market decisions). 
 79. See Roots, supra note 4, at 524–26; see also Belfield, supra note 78, at 3 (noting that 
debt burdens and default rates are higher among minorities). 
 80. See Stiglitz, supra note 2 (“Student debt also is a drag on the slow [economic] 
recovery that began in 2009.”). 
 81. See id. 
 82. See id. 
 83. See supra notes 72–82 and accompanying text. 
 84. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
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how, the federal student loan program should be reformed to reduce student 
debt.85 
B.  Accreditation:  The Gatekeeper to Federal Funds 
As discussed in Part I.A, federal student loans are available to students 
who attend higher education institutions that meet a number of institutional 
eligibility requirements.86  One of these requirements is that these 
institutions be accredited by a USDE-recognized accrediting body, earning 
accreditors the title of the gatekeeper to federal funds.87  Part I.B discusses:  
(1) the structure of the accreditation industry; (2) the process of 
accreditation; (3) the role accreditation plays in the distribution of federal 
funds; and (4) the regulation of the accreditation industry. 
1.  The Structure of the Accreditation Industry 
Despite the important role accreditation plays as an enforcer of academic 
quality and a gatekeeper to federal funds, the American public does not 
understand the accreditation industry.88  This section evaluates both the 
purpose of this “obscure and opaque” industry89 and the key players in the 
industry. 
a.  The Purposes of Accreditation 
Modern accreditation began in the late-nineteenth century with the 
formation of the New England Association of Schools and the Middle 
States Association of Colleges.90  Academics formed these organizations to 
 
 85. The debate and speculation about the student loan debt crisis largely arose in the 
wake of the Great Recession.  Some believe that the mortgage crisis of 2008 and the student 
loan crisis are similar.  For an extensive comparison of the student debt crisis and the 
mortgage bubble, see generally Braucher, supra note 48, Woodman, supra note 66, and 
McGuire, supra note 20.  Despite these similarities, there is still debate about whether the 
student debt crisis poses a similar risk to the economy as the mortgage crisis did before the 
Great Recession. Compare Antony Davies & James R. Harrigan, Why the Education Bubble 
Will Be Worse Than the Housing Bubble, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (June 12, 2012), 
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/economic-intelligence/2012/06/12/the-government-
shouldnt-subsidize-higher-education (arguing that harsh bankruptcy standards and the 
inability to resell an education make student loans more threatening than mortgages), with 
Jeff Macke, Student Loans Are a Societal Problem, Not an Economic Threat, YAHOO FIN. 
(Sept. 10, 2013 9:29 AM), http://finance.yahoo.com/blogs/breakout/student-loans-societal-
problem-not-economic-threat-economist-132904880.html (arguing that there is “minimal 
systemic risk” associated with student debt). 
 86. See supra notes 43–54 and accompanying text. 
 87. See infra Part I.B.3. 
 88. Charles Powell, Accreditation, Assessment, and Compliance:  Addressing the 
Cyclical Challenges of Public Confidence in American Education, 3 J. ASSESSMENT & 
INSTITUTIONAL EFFECTIVENESS 54, 55 (2013). 
 89. Id. at 62. 
 90. See HANK BROWN, AM. ENTER. INST., CTR. ON HIGHER EDUC. REFORM, PROTECTING 
STUDENTS AND TAXPAYERS:  THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S FAILED REGULATORY APPROACH 
AND STEPS FOR REFORM 2 (2013), http://www.goacta.org/images/download/protecting_
students_and_taxpayers_report.pdf. 
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define the bachelor’s degree and to encourage best practices among 
colleges.91 
Today, higher education institutions voluntarily92 engage in the 
accreditation process, which remains a “nongovernmental, self-regulatory, 
peer review system.”93  This peer-review system encompasses both quality 
assurance and quality improvement.94  Accreditors assure quality by setting 
universal standards that all institutions must achieve, and improve quality 
by working with institutions to develop processes to better their educational 
standards.95  Quality assurance and quality improvement reflect “the core 
values of [American academia]:  peer review, the centrality of [institutional] 
mission, institutional autonomy, and academic freedom.”96  Accrediting 
agencies judge academic quality based on a school’s ability to fulfill its 
institutional mission, acknowledging the diversity of these institutions’ 
goals.97 
The modern accreditation industry serves four main purposes.  First, 
accrediting agencies assist institutions with self-analysis and self-
improvement.98  Second, they engender public confidence by signaling to 
students that an institution has a “seal of approval” and meets certain 
standards.99  Third, accreditation creates a level of uniformity among higher 
education institutions, enabling students to transfer between schools.100  
Finally, and most importantly for the purposes of this Note, accreditation 
determines an institution’s eligibility for federal funding.101 
 
 91. See id. 
 92. Though accreditation is considered a “voluntary” process, students who attend 
unaccredited institutions are ineligible for federal student loans and grants. See infra Part 
I.B.3; see also LINDSEY M. BURKE & STUART M. BUTLER, HERITAGE FOUND., 
ACCREDITATION:  REMOVING THE BARRIER TO HIGHER EDUCATION REFORM 8 (2012), 
available at http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED535877.pdf (discussing how accreditation has 
become a “de facto requirement” for institutions).  Because federal student aid and subsidies 
have become an “increasingly large share” of institutions’ budgets, institutions have little 
choice but to seek accreditation. See id. at 11. 
 93. Barbara Brittingham, Accreditation in the United States:  How Did We Get to Where 
We Are?, 2009 NEW DIRECTIONS FOR HIGHER EDUC. 7, 10; see also What Is Accreditation?, 
ADVANCED, http://www.advanc-ed.org/what-accreditation (last visited Feb. 24, 2014). 
 94. See JUDITH S. EATON, COUNCIL FOR HIGHER EDUC. ACCREDITATION, AN OVERVIEW 
OF U.S. ACCREDITATION 9 (2012), available at http://www.chea.org/pdf/Overview%20of%
20US%20Accreditation%202012.pdf. 
 95. See JUDITH S. EATON, COUNCIL FOR HIGHER EDUC. ACCREDITATION, ACCREDITATION 
AND RECOGNITION IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2012), available at http://www.chea.org/pdf/
AccredRecogUS_2012.pdf. 
 96. See Judith S. Eaton, The Future of Accreditation, 40 PLANNING FOR HIGHER EDUC. 8, 
9 (2012). 
 97. See EATON, supra note 94, at 3. 
 98. See BROWN, supra note 90, at 1. 
 99. Id. at 5. 
 100. See id. at 1. 
 101. See id. (“[S]ince federal funding is the lifeblood of most higher education 
institutions, accreditation determines whether a school can remain financially viable.”); see 
also infra Part I.B.3 (discussing the connection between federal funding and accreditation). 
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b.  The Players in Accreditation 
There are several key players in the accreditation process:  the 
educational institutions, accrediting organizations, recognition bodies, and 
the government.102 
Higher education institutions create, fund, and participate in accrediting 
organizations.103  Accrediting organizations review and accredit educational 
institutions and programs.104  Institutions and programs in turn pay annual 
dues once they are accredited and fees for accreditation visits.105  
Accreditation is a peer-review process wherein educators evaluate each 
other and are primarily responsible for setting the industry’s academic 
standards; therefore, accrediting organizations are products of and “derive 
their legitimacy” from higher education as opposed to the government.106 
Accrediting agencies are private, nongovernmental, nonprofit 
organizations responsible for running the “decentralized and complex” 
accreditation process.107  There are four general categories of accrediting 
agencies in the United States:  (1) regional accreditors, which review 
institutions in a geographical region of the United States;108 (2) national 
faith-related accreditors, which review religiously affiliated and doctrinally 
based institutions; (3) national career-related accreditors, which review 
“single-purpose institutions”; and (4) programmatic accreditors, which 
review specific programs and professions (e.g., law and medicine).109  The 
Council for Higher Education Accreditation (CHEA), a private 
organization, coordinates the broad range of accrediting agencies.110 
The USDE asserts control by reviewing and regulating these accrediting 
organizations.111  The government engages in a process known as 
recognition to determine which accrediting agencies are reliable judges of 
 
 102. See EATON, supra note 95, at 3. 
 103. See id. at 4. 
 104. See id. at 3–4. 
 105. See id. at 7. 
 106. See EATON, supra note 94, at 2; see also Jon F. Wergin, Five Essential Tensions in 
Accreditation, in INQUIRY, EVIDENCE, AND EXCELLENCE:  THE PROMISE AND PRACTICE OF 
QUALITY ASSURANCE 27, 27 (Mark LaCelle-Peterson & Diana Rigden eds., 2012) (“Unlike 
virtually every other country, public accountability for quality [in the United States] is not a 
function of government agency but of peer review.”). 
 107. EATON, supra note 94, at 1. 
 108. There are six USDE-recognized regional accreditors in the United States that “form 
the heart of accreditation in America.” See BROWN, supra note 90, at 2.  Regional 
accreditation is viewed as a more traditional path for institutions, and regional accreditors are 
often considered to be more reliable authorities. See Doug Lederman, Tussling Over 
Transfer of Credit, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Feb. 26, 2007), http://www.insidehighered.com/news/
2007/02/26/transfer (discussing how some schools reject academic transfer credits from 
nationally, but not regionally accredited colleges). 
 109. See EATON, supra note 94, at 2; see also Powell, supra note 88, at 65–66 (discussing 
the different scopes of regional versus national accreditors and institutional versus 
programmatic accreditors). 
 110. See EATON, supra note 94, at 6. 
 111. See id. at 5.  CHEA also coordinates accrediting activity in the United States and 
recognizes institutions. See id.  For a more extensive discussion of recognition, see infra Part 
I.B.4. 
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quality.112  As of December 2011, there were seven USDE-recognized 
regional accreditors, four national faith-related accreditors, seven national 
career-related accreditors, and thirty-six programmatic accreditors.113 
The USDE and the secretary of education are responsible for 
promulgating rules under the HEA to regulate these recognized accrediting 
agencies.114  The USDE also appoints members to the National Advisory 
Committee on Institutional Quality and Integrity (NACIQI).115  NACIQI is 
responsible for advising the secretary and helping to generate the standards 
for recognition.116 
2.  The Process of Accreditation 
Higher education institutions may seek two different types of 
accreditation:  institutional accreditation and/or programmatic or 
specialized accreditation.117  When a school receives institutional 
accreditation, this seal of approval applies to the entire college or university 
and necessarily includes all programs and courses offered at that school.118  
Programmatic or specialized accreditation, on the other hand, applies to 
particular departments, schools, or programs within a university.119 
The process of accreditation is similar for both institutional and 
programmatic accreditation.  Institutions are first required to engage in 
“self-study.”120  During the self-study phase, the institution evaluates its 
own performance based on the accrediting agency’s standards and submits a 
written summary to the agency.121  The agency then begins a peer-review 
process during which faculty and academic administrators review the 
institution’s self-study results.122 
Next, the accrediting agency sends a team to the institution for a site 
visit.123  This team may include public, nonacademic members with an 
interest in higher education.124  Finally, a decisionmaking commission of 
 
 112. See BURKE & BUTLER, supra note 92, at 5. 
 113. See EATON, supra note 95, at 4, 25.  There are additional accrediting agencies that 
have been recognized by the CHEA, but not the USDE. See infra Part I.B.4. 
 114. See BURKE & BUTLER, supra note 92, at 5–6. 
 115. See id. 
 116. See 20 U.S.C. § 1011c(c)(1) (2012); see also infra Part I.B.4 (discussing the role of 
NACIQI). 
 117. See BURKE & BUTLER, supra note 92, at 6–7. 
 118. See id. 
 119. See id.  Institutions seeking programmatic accreditation of a particular program, 
department, or school often already have institutional accreditation. See id.  These 
institutions may seek additional programmatic accreditation as a “quality control measure for 
specific programs or departments” or to make their graduates eligible for credentialing 
examinations. Id.; see also Accreditation in the U.S., U.S. DEP’T EDUC. (Jan. 16, 2014), 
http://www2.ed.gov/admins/finaid/accred/accreditation.html. 
 120. See EATON, supra note 94, at 4. 
 121. See id. 
 122. See id. 
 123. See id. 
 124. See id. at 5. 
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the accrediting agency reviews the results of the studies, visits, and 
determines if an institution is worthy of accreditation.125 
Each accrediting agency creates its own guidelines for accreditation; 
however, the regional accrediting agencies focus on similar qualities in the 
institutions they review.  For example, the Middle States Commission on 
Higher Education, a USDE-recognized accrediting body, requires its 
evaluators to consider the totality of the circumstances in reviewing an 
institution’s credentials.126  Evaluators assess institutional resources (both 
human and financial), leadership and governance, and administration as part 
of the self-study.127  Each of these standards is interpreted in the “context of 
the institution’s mission and situation.”128  Similarly, evaluators consider 
student admissions, student support services, faculty, and educational 
offerings to determine if these programs and services further this 
mission.129 
After evaluating the institution based on the agency’s standards, the 
agency determines if an institution should be granted or denied 
accreditation.130  The accrediting agency continues to monitor and 
periodically review those institutions that receive accreditation.131  If an 
accrediting agency decides to revoke accreditation at any time, the 
institution has a right of appeal under the HEA.132 
3.  Accreditation and Federal Funding 
As discussed in Part I.B.1 of this Note, higher education institutions have 
relied on accreditation to ensure academic quality and earn public trust 
since the nineteenth century;133 however, in the last sixty years, 
accreditation has taken on a new role by providing access to billions of 
dollars of federal funds.134  Higher education institutions must be accredited 
by a USDE-recognized accrediting body to be eligible for Title IV federal 
funding under the HEA.135  The federal government relies on accreditation 
 
 125. See id. 
 126. See MIDDLE STATES COMM’N ON HIGHER EDUC., CHARACTERISTICS OF EXCELLENCE 
IN HIGHER EDUCATION:  REQUIREMENTS OF AFFILIATION AND STANDARDS FOR 
ACCREDITATION, at viii (2011), available at http://www.msche.org/publications/CHX-2011-
WEB.pdf. 
 127. Id. at ix–xi. 
 128. Id. at viii; see also EATON, supra note 94, at 3 (“Institutional mission is central to 
judgments of academic quality.”).  The Middle States Commission on Higher Education, 
similar to other accrediting agencies, sets broad guidelines for the institution’s mission:  the 
institutional purpose must be defined, indicating what the institution intends to accomplish 
and whom it hopes to serve. See MIDDLE STATES COMM’N ON HIGHER EDUC., supra note 126, 
at ix. 
 129. See MIDDLE STATES COMM’N ON HIGHER EDUC., supra note 126, at x. 
 130. See EATON, supra note 94, at 4–5. 
 131. See id. 
 132. 20 U.S.C. § 1099b(a)(6)(c) (2012). 
 133. See BROWN, supra note 90, at 2–3. 
 134. See Powell, supra note 88, at 63. 
 135. See 20 U.S.C. § 1002 (listing the requirements of institutions of higher education 
that receive federal funding); see also Austin Smith, Subprime Goes to College, N.Y. POST 
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to assess the academic quality of the institutions and programs for which it 
provides federal funding.136 
The link between federal funding of education and academic 
accreditation originated with the Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance Act of 
1952137 (known as the GI Bill).138  The GI Bill provided funding for 
“thousands of [World War II] veterans to return to school.”139  Many 
private educational institutions sprang up in response to the flood of federal 
funds in the education industry.140  Because many of these private 
institutions were of “questionable quality,” the government limited funding 
eligibility to only those students enrolled at institutions accredited by 
recognized accreditation bodies.141  The government chose to rely on 
accreditation as a check on institutional quality rather than develop its own 
system of quality review.142  Accreditation thus became the key to the 
government’s funds, sparking an increase in the number of institutions 
seeking accreditation.143 
4.  Regulating Accreditation 
Given the responsibility of accrediting agencies of evaluating educational 
quality and indirectly controlling the distribution of federal funds, these 
agencies must be held accountable for their decisions.144  This section 
addresses two important checks on accrediting bodies:  the competitive 
market and the government.145 
a.  The Competitive Market 
First, the marketplace for public confidence plays a role in holding 
accrediting agencies accountable for their decisions.146  Public confidence 
in the accrediting agency’s seal of approval is essential to its continued 
survival.147  If an accrediting agency loses public trust, institutions will 
choose other accrediting agencies to evaluate their quality. 
 
(June 6, 2010, 4:28 AM), http://nypost.com/2010/06/06/subprime-goes-to-college/.  For a 
full discussion of Title IV federal funding, see supra Part I.A. 
 136. See EATON, supra note 95, at 18 (noting that federal and state funds are often 
contingent on an institution’s accredited status).  The relationship between state governments 
and accrediting agencies is beyond the scope of this Note, which focuses only on Title IV 
federal funding. 
 137. Pub. L. No. 82-550, 66 Stat. 663. 
 138. See Powell, supra note 88, at 57–58; see also BROWN, supra note 90, at 2–3. 
 139. See Powell, supra note 88, at 57–58. 
 140. See id. 
 141. See id. 
 142. See Brittingham, supra note 93, at 13 (discussing the history and development of 
accreditation). 
 143. See id. at 13–14. 
 144. See Wergin, supra note 106, at 27–28. 
 145. See id. at 28. 
 146. See id. 
 147. See id. at 27–28. 
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Though the threat of competition among accreditors is theoretically a 
check on accrediting agencies’ power, many argue that accrediting agencies 
have formed a cartel148 that insulates them from the influence of the 
competitive market.149  The government has maintained this cartel by 
recognizing only a limited number of accreditors.150  This is particularly 
true for regional accreditors, who have divided the country into regional 
cartels, virtually eliminating an institution’s ability to choose another 
accreditor.151  Therefore, the competitive market is not necessarily an 
effective regulator of accreditation. 
b.  Government Regulation 
Second, the federal government regulates accrediting agencies through 
the HEA.152  Accrediting agencies and the government have had a long and 
increasingly complicated relationship.153  Institutional independence and 
autonomy have always been the mark of U.S. higher education.154  In recent 
years, however, the government has been exercising increased control over 
accrediting agencies.155 
The goal of this regulation is to reconcile the tension between the 
government’s traditional hands-off approach to education and the desire to 
confirm that federal funds are only distributed to quality institutions.  The 
HEA seeks to ensure that the accrediting agencies responsible for 
monitoring the quality of higher education are legitimate organizations 
capable of determining which institutions are worthy of federal funds.156  
 
 148. A cartel is defined as “[a]n association of firms with common interests, seeking to 
prevent extreme or unfair competition, allocate markets, or share knowledge.”  BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 243 (9th ed. 2009). 
 149. See Jane S. Shaw, Breaking the Barriers to Entry, JOHN WILLIAM POPE CTR. FOR 
HIGHER EDUC. POL’Y (Nov. 16, 2012), http://www.popecenter.org/commentaries/
article.html?id=2764; see also Anne D. Neal, Seeking Higher-Ed Accountability:  Ending 
Federal Accreditation, CHANGE MAG., Sept.–Oct. 2008, at 24. 
 150. See Shaw, supra note 149. 
 151. See Neal, supra note 149, at 27. 
 152. Higher Education Act, Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219 (codified as amended at 20 
U.S.C. §§ 1070–99 (1988)). 
 153. See Brittingham, supra note 93, at 14–16. 
 154. See Leah K. Matthews, Toward Institutional Autonomy or Nationalization?  A Case 
Study of the Federal Role in U.S. Higher Education Accreditation 7 (Apr. 30, 2012) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, George Mason University) (on file with Fordham Law 
Review). 
 155. See Powell, supra note 88, at 60; see also Wergin, supra note 106, at 28–29 (noting 
that the USDE has become “far more intrusive in the past decade”).  Given the increased 
amount of student loan debt and the federal investment in the higher education system, the 
government wants to ensure that it is providing funding only to quality institutions. See 
supra Part I.A.  The government is seeking to prevent the creation of diploma mills, for-
profit institutions that continue to accept federal funding without ever providing any value to 
students. See Wergin, supra note 106, at 29. 
 156. See Judith S. Eaton, What Future for Accreditation:  The Challenge and Opportunity 
of the Accreditation-Federal Government Relationship, in INQUIRY, EVIDENCE, AND 
EXCELLENCE:  THE PROMISE AND PRACTICE OF QUALITY ASSURANCE, supra note 106, at 77, 
79. 
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Two of the most significant forms of government regulation of accrediting 
agencies are (i) the process of recognition and (ii) governance regulations. 
i.  Recognition 
Recognition is the main process by which the government regulates 
accrediting agencies.157  Through recognition, the USDE “scrutinizes and 
judges accrediting organizations . . . for their capacity to serve as these 
reliable authorities” on the quality of higher education for the purpose of 
receiving funds under the HEA.158  Recognition is essentially a means of 
accrediting the accreditors.159  The secretary of education periodically 
publishes a list of recognized agencies in the Federal Register, giving the 
public and higher education institutions notice of which accrediting 
agencies have government approval.160 
While accreditation is strictly a nongovernmental activity, recognition is 
a product of government regulation under the HEA.161  Though the HEA is 
very general in its standards for recognition, it delegates authority to the 
USDE and the secretary of education to promulgate regulations establishing 
specific criteria for recognition.162  These regulations provide (i) detailed 
eligibility requirements for agencies seeking recognition, (ii) substantive 
and procedural controls over agencies’ accreditation processes, and 
(iii) procedural requirements for the recognition process. 
First, the regulations establish the eligibility requirements for agencies 
seeking recognition.  An agency seeking recognition must establish the 
scope of its accrediting activities, including the geographic area and degree 
level it will accredit.163  The agency must also show that it:  (1) granted 
accreditation or preaccreditation164 to institutions; or (2) conducted 
accrediting activities for at least two years prior to seeking recognition.165  
Similarly, the agency must demonstrate that its standards and procedures 
for accreditation are widely accepted by educators, institutions, licensing 
bodies, or employers.166  These and other eligibility requirements indicate 
that accrediting agencies must have an established reputation before seeking 
accreditation. 
 
 157. See id.  CHEA also regulates accrediting agencies through an independent 
recognition process. See supra note 111.  CHEA recognition, though valuable for building 
public confidence, is not relevant to the distribution of federal funds. 
 158. See Eaton, supra note 156, at 79. 
 159. See EATON, supra note 94, at 9; see also BURKE & BUTLER, supra note 92, at 6. 
 160. 34 C.F.R. § 602.2(a) (2013). 
 161. 20 U.S.C. § 1099b (2012). 
 162. Id. § 1099b(a). 
 163. 34 C.F.R. §§ 602.11–.12. 
 164. Preaccreditation is defined as the status an accrediting agency grants to an institution 
for a limited time, signifying that the institution is “progressing towards accreditation and is 
likely to attain accreditation before the expiration of that limited period of time.” 34 C.F.R. 
§ 602.3. 
 165. Id. § 602.12. 
 166. Id. § 602.13. 
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Second, the HEA and USDE regulations establish substantive 
requirements for a recognized accrediting agency’s accrediting process.  
The HEA requires that accrediting agencies establish criteria for 
institutional or programmatic accreditation that include an “appropriate 
measure . . . of student achievement.”167  The agency seeking recognition 
must consistently apply standards that “respect the stated mission of the 
institution of higher education . . . and that ensure that the courses or 
programs of instruction . . . are of sufficient quality to achieve . . . the stated 
objective.”168  The HEA instructs accrediting agencies to evaluate higher 
education institutions’ fulfillment of their stated missions, as discussed in 
Part I.B.2. 
While accrediting agencies are largely free to create their own 
substantive criteria for assessing institutions, the HEA provides general 
guidelines that the agencies must follow.169  Accrediting agencies must 
assess ten features of an institution, including student achievement, 
curricula, faculty, facilities, fiscal and administrative capacity, student 
support services, and admissions processes.170 
The agency must also develop a system of review to show its standards 
are adequate and comprehensive.171  These guidelines provide very basic 
requirements of an accrediting agency’s assessment process.172  Agencies 
are required to assess the curricula, faculty, and student support services, 
but the HEA does not provide guidance as to how to measure any of these 
qualities.173 
Third, the HEA and USDE regulations establish procedural requirements 
for applying the substantive standards of the accrediting process.174  An 
agency seeking recognition must demonstrate that it evaluates whether an 
institution has achieved educational objectives “consistent with its 
mission.”175  The agency must require institutions to engage in a self-study 
process and conduct at least one on-site review.176  After generating its own 
report about the institution’s self-analysis, the agency can make an 
accreditation decision.177 
 
 167. 20 U.S.C. § 1099b(a). 
 168. Id. § 1099b(a)(4)(A). 
 169. Id. § 1099b(a)(5). 
 170. Id. (listing all ten aspects of a higher education institution that accrediting bodies 
consider). 
 171. 34 C.F.R. § 602.21. 
 172. See id. 
 173. 20 U.S.C. § 1099b. 
 174. Another key procedural regulation is the requirement that all accrediting agency 
procedures satisfy due process. See 34 C.F.R. § 602.25.  This due process requirement 
subjects agency decisions to judicial review and is the subject of extensive legislation that is 
beyond the scope of this Note.  For an overview of due process and accreditation, see 
generally Michael W. Prairie & Lori A. Chamberlain, Due Process in the Accreditation 
Context, 21 J.C. & U.L. 61 (1994). 
 175. 34 C.F.R. § 602.17. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id.  The agency must also have established controls to ensure that its standards are 
applied consistently throughout this process. Id. § 602.18. 
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In addition to the eligibility, substantive, and procedural requirements 
outlined as part of the recognition process of government regulation, the 
HEA and USDE regulations control the application process for 
recognition.178  This process mirrors the accreditation process the agency 
undertakes in reviewing institutions.  First, the agency seeking recognition 
submits an application to the USDE including evidence of its compliance 
with the substantive and procedural requirements of the accreditation 
process discussed above.179  The USDE may conduct site visits of the 
accrediting agency and observe the accreditors’ on-site visits to institutions 
or during accreditation meetings.180 
After the USDE reviews the accrediting agency’s application for 
recognition, it makes a recommendation and submits all application 
materials to the NACIQI.181  Accrediting agencies and third parties are free 
to make presentations at NACIQI meetings.182  After NACIQI makes a 
recommendation to the secretary, the USDE make a final decision about the 
recognition status of an accrediting agency.183 
ii.  Governance Standards 
In addition to the regulations related to recognition, the HEA and USDE 
regulations control the governance and organizational structure of 
accrediting agencies.  These governance standards require that accrediting 
agencies be “separate and independent.”184  “Separate and independent” 
accrediting agencies must establish rules to avoid conflicts of interests, have 
a certain proportion of public members on their decisionmaking bodies, and 
meet certain other requirements.185  However, 34 C.F.R. § 602.14(d) 
provides an exception to these independence requirements for any agencies 
recognized prior to October 1, 1991.186 
 
 178. The recognition process described here applies to initial recognition.  An agency that 
has already been recognized by the USDE may apply for continued recognition when it is 
time for periodic review (every five years), or when the scope of its accrediting activity has 
changed. See Accreditation in the U.S., supra note 119.  The differences between these 
recognition processes are beyond the scope of this Note. 
 179. 34 C.F.R. § 602.31. 
 180. See National Recognition of Accrediting Agencies by the U.S. Secretary of 
Education, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., http://www2.ed.gov/admins/finaid/accred/accreditation_
pg3.html (last modified Feb. 12, 2014). 
 181. See id. 
 182. See id. 
 183. See id.  Despite this extensively regulated process, critics argue that recognition does 
little to police accreditors as none of the six USDE-recognized regional accreditors has ever 
lost recognition. See, e.g., Sarah Molinero, Note, Reexamining the Examiners:  The Need for 
Increased Government Regulation of Accreditation in Higher Education, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 
833, 857 (2013). 
 184. 34 C.F.R. § 602.14(a)(1)(iii). 
 185. Id. § 602.14(b). 
 186. Id. § 602.14(d).  In addition to being recognized since 1991, these accrediting bodies 
must show that (i) related trade associations play no role in their decisionmaking policies, 
(ii) such trade associations do not receive any nonpublic information, and (iii) the agency has 
“sufficient budgetary and administrative autonomy” to independently accredit schools. Id. 
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II.  ECONOMIC THEORIES 
Part I of this Note discussed the intertwining institutional frameworks of 
the federal student loan program and accreditation.  Part II discusses two 
economic theories that are at the core of the federal funding-accreditation 
dilemma:  (A) agency costs and (B) principles of valuation.  These theories 
help to explain why the USDE and accreditors differ in their approaches to 
evaluating education. 
A.  Agency Theory 
First, agency theory helps to explain the relationship between the USDE 
and accreditors.  This section addresses (1) the general economic principles 
of agency theory and agency costs, (2) how agency theory manifests in 
different contexts, and (3) how principals can regulate agents to reduce 
agency costs. 
1.  Agency Theory Generally 
Agency theory is an economic theory that is defined as the “analytic 
expression of the contractual relationship of two (or more) parties, in which 
one party, designated as the principal, engages another party, designated as 
the agent, to perform some service on behalf of the principal.”187  This 
theory reflects that idea that the principal and agent, though acting as 
cooperating parties, may have different goals and interests that cause the 
agent to act in a way that does not serve the principal’s needs.188 
A principal-agent relationship may cause an “agency problem” or impose 
“agency costs” when (1) the principal and agent have divergent interests 
and (2) the principal has difficulty assessing the agent’s actions.189  
Divergent interests occur when the desires or goals of the principal and 
agent conflict.190  Agency theory rests on the assumption that actors—
whether individuals, governments, firms, or organizations—act in their own 
self-interest to fulfill their own desires.191 
These divergent interests only impose agency costs on the principal, 
however, if the principal cannot verify or assess the agent’s actions.192  If 
the information available to both the principal and agent is identical, the 
principal can perfectly monitor the agent’s actions and identify and rectify 
an agent’s opportunistic behavior.193  However, information asymmetries 
 
 187. Jussi Kivisto, The Government–Higher Education Institution Relationship:  
Theoretical Considerations From the Perspective of Agency Theory, 11 TERTIARY EDUC. & 
MGMT. 1, 1 (2005). 
 188. See Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, Agency Theory:  An Assessment and Review, 14 ACAD. 
MGMT. REV. 57, 58 (1989). 
 189. See Kivisto, supra note 187, at 1–2. 
 190. See id. 
 191. See Eisenhardt, supra note 188, at 59, 64.  For organizations and firms, it can 
additionally be assumed that there is “partial goal conflict among participants,” suggesting 
that there is an internal divergence of interests as well. Id. at 59. 
 192. See Kivisto, supra note 187, at 1–2. 
 193. See id. 
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make it difficult for the principal to monitor and assess an agent’s 
behavior.194 
2.  Agency Theory in Different Contexts 
Agency theory is often discussed in the context of the corporate 
structure.195  Corporations are faced with an agency problem because they 
are owned by one group of people—shareholders—and managed by another 
group of people—directors—who may have different ideas about how the 
corporation should operate.196  Though this shareholder-manager dilemma 
is considered the archetypal principal-agent scenario, agency theory can be 
applied in circumstances in which the interests at stake change,197 including 
government outsourcing198 and the nonprofit sector.199 
First, principals and agents in the government context have additional 
behavioral influences that affect their decisions.200  The government often 
relies on private actors or government agencies to create regulatory 
standards.201  Principals and agents in this situation are faced with political 
influences that affect the self-interested choices they make.202  Parties have 
additional constituents and strategies to consider in making their 
decisions.203  The impact of these constituents must be considered when 
evaluating the divergent interests of the principal and agent. 
Second, the nonprofit sector also presents unique challenges for 
principal-agent relationships.  Often the government acts as a principal in 
relationships with an agent nonprofit organization.204  The principal 
(government) seeks to maximize the services received by the nonprofit 
 
 194. See id. 
 195. See Eisenhardt, supra note 188, at 59 (discussing the influential articles exploring 
agency theory in the corporate context); see also Eleanor Brown, Donors, Ideologues, and 
Bureaucrats:  The Principal-Agent Relationship Between Government and the Nonprofit 
Sector 1 (June 2006) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Fordham Law Review). 
 196. In the corporate context, shareholder owners are not able to “perfectly monitor the 
behavior of managers.” See Brown, supra note 195, at 1.  Therefore, shareholders cannot 
always correct behavior that deviates from the shareholders’ interests, creating agency costs. 
 197. See Eisenhardt, supra note 188, at 57 (noting that agency theory has been used by 
scholars in accounting, economics, finance, marketing, political science, organizational 
behavior, and sociology); see also Kivisto, supra note 187, at 2. 
 198. See generally Sidney A. Shapiro, Outsourcing Government Regulation, 53 DUKE 
L.J. 389 (2003) (discussing how the government’s reliance on private firms to regulate 
industries implicates agency theory). 
 199. See generally Brown, supra note 195 (discussing the tension between donors, 
managers, and the government in the nonprofit sector). 
 200. See Shapiro, supra note 198, at 416–17 (discussing political influences on principal 
and agent behavior). 
 201. See id. at 406–07 (“An agency’s reliance on private actors to write regulatory 
standards creates agency problems.”). 
 202. See id. at 416–17 (discussing that the decision to employ private firms may involve 
political influences). 
 203. See id. 
 204. See Brown, supra note 195, at 1 (considering “the role of government as principal 
and the nonprofit sector as a set of agents from whom, collectively, the government wants to 
maximize service provision”). 
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organization, typically the provision of consumption goods and services.205  
Just as the government actor must consider political effects of its decisions, 
nonprofit agents often consider ideological interests.206  The principal may 
have different ideologies that cause a rift between the principal and 
agent.207 
Both the government and nonprofit relationships present the possibility 
of “dual agency” or the “compounded agency” problem.208  Compounded 
agency addresses the complexity of multiple, simultaneous conflicts of 
interest in relationships.209  These complex scenarios often arise in the 
context of public-private partnerships.210  In these relationships, a public 
organization (e.g., a government agency) acts as agent for the public 
consumers.211  The public organization, as agent for the public, hires a 
private actor—a for-profit or nonprofit organization—to perform a service 
for the public actor.212  This private actor is therefore an agent to the public 
actor and also an indirect agent for public consumers.213  These complex 
relationships increase the risk of divergent interests and information 
asymmetries.214 
3.  Reducing Agency Costs 
When a principal-agent relationship imposes agency costs on the 
principal, the principal can take certain steps to motivate the agent to 
behave in accordance with the principal’s interests and thus reduce these 
costs.215  Positivist agency theory involves (1) identifying situations in 
which a principal and agent are likely to have conflicting goals and 
(2) generating governance mechanisms that can limit the potential self-
serving behavior of the agent.216  This section discusses two types of 
 
 205. See id.  These goods and services range from food and shelter to healthcare and 
education. See id. at 2–3.  In addition to provision of services, the government also looks to 
the nonprofit sector to “safeguard certain basic liberties and freedoms.” Id. at 2. 
 206. See id. at 5 (discussing the concern that donors only donate to nonprofits when there 
is a “good ideological match” between their ideology and the nonprofit’s purpose). 
 207. See id. (discussing ideological matches). 
 208. See Jeff W. Trailer et al., A Compounded Agency Problem:  An Empirical 
Examination of Public-Private Partnerships, 5 J. AM. ACAD. BUS. CAMBRIDGE 308, 308 
(2004). 
 209. See id. 
 210. See id. 
 211. See id. 
 212. See id. 
 213. See id. 
 214. See id. (discussing that there are “[m]ultiple, conflicting goals [that] inherently exist” 
in these relationships). 
 215. See Eisenhardt, supra note 188, at 58 (“[T]he focus of [agency] theory is on 
determining the most efficient contract governing the principal-agent relationship.”); see 
also Kivisto, supra note 187, at 7–8 (discussing the contract options that balance the 
tradeoffs of measuring behavior and measuring outcomes). 
 216. See Eisenhardt, supra note 188, at 59. 
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governance mechanisms—behavior-based and outcome-based 
monitoring—and when each type of governance is most effective.217 
Behavior-based monitoring focuses on reducing the informational 
asymmetries that exist between the principal and agent.218  Reducing 
information asymmetries allows the principal to detect and correct the 
agent’s self-serving behavior.219  Behavior-based monitoring may involve 
developing reporting structures, supervising budgeting systems, or using 
boards of directors to oversee agents’ activities.220 
Outcome-based evaluations focus on reducing the conflicts of interest 
between principals and agents.221  These evaluations tie the agent’s reward 
to certain outcomes, aligning the preferences of the agent with those of the 
principal.222 
The benefits of behavior-based monitoring and outcome-based 
evaluations depend on the principal-agent relationship and the nature of the 
task the agent is performing.  Principals deciding whether to use outcome-
based or behavior-based governance mechanisms to reduce agency costs 
should consider the extent to which (i) the principal’s and agent’s goals 
conflict, (ii) the agent’s task is programmable, (iii) the outcome is 
uncertain, and (iv) the outcome is measurable.223 
First, goal conflict assessment considers how divergent the parties’ goals 
and interests are.224  If there is a major conflict between the principal and 
agent’s goals, outcome-based evaluations tend to be more appropriate and 
the principal should attempt to align the agent’s incentives to its desired 
outcomes.225 
Second, task programmability evaluates the degree to which the agent’s 
behaviors can be specified in advance.226  If a principal can easily dictate 
the actions that the agent must take to achieve the principal’s goal, then 
behavior-based governance may be more appropriate.227 
Third, outcome uncertainty measures the extent to which the outcome 
depends on the agent’s work versus how much the outcome depends on the 
external environment.228  If the agent’s work has little connection to the 
 
 217. See id. at 60 (noting that principals must determine the “optimal contract, behavior 
versus outcome”); see also Kivisto, supra note 187, at 6. 
 218. See Kivisto, supra note 187, at 6. 
 219. See id. 
 220. See id. 
 221. See Eisenhardt, supra note 188, at 59–60. 
 222. See id.; see also Kivisto, supra note 187, at 6. 
 223. These four factors are a nonexhaustive list.  Other factors that can be taken into 
consideration include the nature of the agency relationship and the risk aversion of the 
parties. See Kivisto, supra note 187, at 8–12; see also Eisenhardt, supra note 188, at 61–62. 
 224. See Kivisto, supra note 187, at 11. 
 225. See id. 
 226. See id. at 10–11. 
 227. See id. at 11. 
 228. See id. at 9. 
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outcome, it is “not reasonable to base the contract on outcomes.”229  Thus, 
behavior-based mechanisms are more appropriate in these situations.230 
Finally, outcome measurability refers to the ease with which a principal 
can measure the agent’s productivity or success in completing an assigned 
task.231  In deciding if an outcome is measurable, principals should consider 
if outcomes could be defined and effectively measured.232  Generally, when 
outcomes are easily measured, the task lends itself to outcome-based 
evaluation mechanisms.233 
Although these four factors are considerations in determining the 
effectiveness of outcome-based and behavior-based governance, there are 
drawbacks to both forms of monitoring. Both types of governance 
mechanisms increase measurement costs, namely, the cost of monitoring 
and evaluating the other party in a transaction.234  Principals must consider 
these costs in deciding to employ governance mechanisms.235 
The relationships described with respect to federal student loans and 
accreditation in Part I.A and I.B, respectively, present an agency problem.  
This agency problem is discussed further in Part III of this Note. 
B.  Principles of Valuation 
Assessing a principal-agent relationship using the four factors described 
above often involves measuring and valuing the activities and goals of both 
the principal and agent.  This section addresses (1) the subjective theory of 
value and (2) proposed methods to value education, both of which 
illuminate the government-accreditor agency relationship and the potential 
solutions to this particularly problematic agency relationship. 
1.  The Subjective Theory of Value 
According to the subjective theory of value,236 a good or service’s value 
depends on the utility that good or service provides to the individual 
consumer, rather than any objective or intrinsic quality of the good or 
service itself.237  “Utility” is the economic term for the “satisfaction an 
 
 229. Id.  When there are a variety of external factors that can influence outcomes, 
outcome-based contracts are unattractive because the outcome will not necessarily reflect the 
agent’s actions. Id. 
 230. See id. 
 231. See id. at 8. 
 232. See id. 
 233. See id. 
 234. See Shapiro, supra note 198, at 393–95. 
 235. See id. 
 236. The Austrian School of Economics first proposed the subjective theory of value. 
THOMAS C. TAYLOR, AN INTRODUCTION TO AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 40 (1980).  This theory 
soon replaced the labor theory in mainstream economics. See infra note 237. 
 237. See TAYLOR, supra note 236, at 40 (“[Value] does not reside objectively and 
intrinsically in the things themselves, apart from the individual who is making an 
evaluation.”).  The notion that a good’s value is not based on its inherent qualities is opposed 
by the labor theory of value. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Marginalist Revolution in Legal 
Thought, 46 VAND. L. REV. 305, 352 (1993).  According to the labor theory of value, a 
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individual actor derives from achieving an end.”238  The subjective theory 
of value holds that measuring this utility is problematic because of its 
subjective nature.239  Individuals have different preferences and derive 
various amounts of satisfaction from different goods.240  Individuals rank 
their choices and seek the alternative that maximizes their utility.241 
In evaluating how an individual ranks her choices among goods and 
services, the subjective theory of value focuses on the principle of 
diminishing marginal utility.242  According to this principle, the value of an 
additional unit of a good provides less utility than the preceding unit of that 
good.243 
The existence of individual subjective hierarchies of goods and the 
principle of diminishing marginal utility explain pricing in the market.244  
The individual, subjective evaluations of goods and services in the market 
affect both the supply and demand of goods.245  These subjective 
preferences affect the amount of money that consumers allocate to goods 
and services, thus determining price.246 
 
 
 
good’s value is “a function of that which [was] invested” in producing the good. Id.  
Subjective value theory replaced the labor theory in mainstream economics during the 
“marginalist revolution” of the 1870s. Leland Yeager, Why Subjectivism?, 1 REV. AUSTRIAN 
ECON. 5, 15 (1987).  Further analysis of the labor theory of value is beyond the scope of this 
Note. 
 238. Joseph Becker, Procrustean Jurisprudence:  An Austrian School Economic Critique 
of the Separation and Regulation of Liberties in the Twentieth Century United States, 15 N. 
ILL. U. L. REV. 671, 693–94 (1995). 
 239. Id. at 694. 
 240. See TAYLOR, supra note 236, at 40–41 (“The extent to which a thing gives 
satisfaction is always personal.”). 
 241. See Alexander Tabarrok, Subjective Value Theory:  A Reformulation, AUSTRIAN 
ECON. NEWSL. (The Ludwig von Mises Inst., Auburn, Ala.), Fall 1990, at 6.  The concept of 
“utility” or “satisfaction” is often incorrectly equated with happiness in the context of the 
subjective theory of value. Id.  Utility is independent of human emotions; humans may make 
choices based on their values that do not necessarily make them happier. Id. 
 242. See Becker, supra note 238, at 694–95. 
 243. See id.  Diminishing marginal utility and the subjective theory of value explain the 
“water-diamond paradox” in economics:  why water, though essential to human life, has a 
lower price than diamonds. See TAYLOR, supra note 236, at 41–44.  Given the scarcity of 
diamonds and the relative abundance of water, the principle of diminishing marginal utility 
dictates that the next unit of water will be devoted to a use of lesser importance. See id.  
These prices would change if an individual were faced with the choice between all water and 
all diamonds in existence; however the subjective theory of value focuses on a definite 
amount of goods rather than the whole category of goods. See id. 
 244. See Tabarrok, supra note 241, at 7 (stating that the purpose of subjective value 
theory is to explain prices). 
 245. See Yeager, supra note 237, at 15 (noting that “subjective factors operate on both 
sides” of supply and demand). 
 246. See TAYLOR, supra note 236, at 48. 
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2.  Methods of Valuing Education 
Despite the subjective theory of value, education experts in government, 
accreditation, and the private sector try to value “quality higher 
education.”247  Many applaud the benefits of education—increasing skilled 
workers, promoting American competitiveness in technological 
development, increasing participation in democratic society248—but how 
are these benefits quantified?249  Should universities be assessed for quality 
at the institutional level, programmatic level, or class level?250 
Ultimately, there is no “generally accepted understanding” of what a 
quality higher education entails.251  This section addresses competing 
theories for how education should be valued:  (a) a financial perspective; 
(b) measuring inputs; (c) measuring outputs; and (d) comprehensive rating 
systems. 
a.  Financial Valuation of Education 
First, a purely financial valuation of education focuses on the student’s 
financial costs and benefits of attending higher education.252  A student’s 
decision to seek higher education is therefore based on a comparison of the 
present discounted value of benefits and the present discounted value of the 
cost of attending.253  Benefits are measured by the gains in future 
earnings,254 while costs include tuition, fees, and foregone wages.255 
 
 247. Despite the repeated attempts to value education, some suggest that a common 
standard of valuation would destroy the “diversity of opinion about what a college education 
means,” which has “been seen as a strength of American higher education.” See, e.g., Doug 
Lederman, What Degrees Should Mean, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Jan. 25, 2011), 
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2011/01/25/defining_what_a_college_degree_recipien
t_should_know_and_be_able_to_do (suggesting that commonality among educational 
standards should not be the goal). 
 248. For a discussion of the benefits of higher education, see supra note 65 and 
accompanying text. 
 249. See Wergin, supra note 106, at 27 (discussing the “quality conundrum”). 
 250. See GEORGE C. LEEF & ROXANA D. BURRIS, AM. COUNCIL OF TRS. & ALUMNI, CAN 
COLLEGE ACCREDITATION LIVE UP TO ITS PROMISE? 7, 18–19 (2002), available at 
http://www.chea.org/pdf/CanAccreditationFulfillPromise.pdf. 
 251. See Lederman, supra note 247 (quoting Jamie P. Merisotis, president and chief 
executive officer of the Lumina Foundation, who suggests that this undefined concept of 
“quality” has frustrated policymakers, employers, and students). But see Press Release, U.S. 
Dep’t of Educ., Assessing Value and Opportunity in Higher Educ. (Sept. 20, 2013), 
available at http://www.ed.gov/news/speeches/assessing-value-and-opportunity-higher-
education (rejecting “the idea that the value of a college education is so elusive, so 
inexpressible that no ratings system can ever meaningfully help consumers determine its 
value”). 
 252. See Avery & Turner, supra note 64, at 172–77 (discussing education using an 
investment analysis). 
 253. See id. at 172. 
 254. See id.  A college degree is estimated to provide an 84 percent income premium. See 
CARNEVALE ET AL., supra note 65, at 1. 
 255. See Avery & Turner, supra note 64, at 172. 
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This valuation methodology is criticized because it fails to consider the 
“substantial variation” in these metrics from student to student.256  
Students’ costs and benefits vary depending on a number of factors, 
including their success in completing school and their choice of 
occupation.257  Critics claim that this method is oversimplified and fails to 
consider individual differences, the difficulty of predicting costs and 
benefits, and nonfinancial and intangible benefits of education.258 
b.  Input Valuation 
Second, some suggest valuing schools based on their educational inputs, 
such as the facilities and capacity of the school.259  Accrediting agencies 
have traditionally focused on inputs when assessing quality and have 
assumed that a school with proper inputs and processes provides acceptable 
quality education.260  The American Council of Trustees and Alumni 
(ACTA), skeptical of using inputs to measure quality, has compared this 
methodology to a car inspection:  “If the accrediting process were applied to 
automobile inspections, cars would ‘pass’ as long as they had tires, doors, 
and an engine—without anyone ever turning the key to see if the car 
actually operated.”261  Critics of this method, including ACTA, argue that 
inputs have a “dubious link to student performance, skill acquisition, and 
employability,” and therefore do not reflect quality of education.262 
c.  Output Valuation 
Those who criticize input valuation may prefer that educational quality 
be measured by student outputs.  Assessing quality based on outputs could 
involve measuring tangible statistical data or measuring learning outcomes.  
Statistical data may include graduation rates, employment rates, and 
graduate earnings.263  These measurements are criticized for the same 
reasons financial valuations fail to assess quality:  they vary widely by 
student and fail to capture the intangible benefits of education.264 
In addition to statistical outcomes, some encourage assessing quality 
based on more flexible student outcomes.  For example, the Lumina 
Foundation has developed a Degree Qualification Profile to assess learning 
 
 256. Id. at 177. 
 257. See id. 
 258. See id. 
 259. See LEEF & BURRIS, supra note 250, at 7, 18–19; see also BURKE & BUTLER, supra 
note 92, at 8–9. 
 260. See LEEF & BURRIS, supra note 250, at 7. 
 261. See BURKE & BUTLER, supra note 92, at 9 (quoting AM. COUNCIL TRUSTEES & 
ALUMNI, WHY ACCREDITATION DOESN’T WORK AND WHAT POLICYMAKERS CAN DO ABOUT 
IT 6 (2007), available at http://www.goacta.org/images/download/why_accreditation_
doesnt_work.pdf). 
 262. See id. at 8–9. 
 263. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., supra note 251. 
 264. See supra notes 256–58 and accompanying text. 
1934 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
outcomes as a reflection of educational quality.265  This profile seeks to set 
minimum standards for qualified schools at different degree levels in five 
areas of learning:  applied learning, intellectual skills, specialized 
knowledge, broad integrative knowledge, and civic learning.266  These 
measurements escape the inflexibility of the financial valuations; however, 
the Lumina Profile and other student learning outcome methodologies are 
very fluid concepts that could be interpreted in many different ways by the 
evaluator.267 
d.  Comprehensive Rating Systems 
Finally, comprehensive rating systems seek to combine the 
methodologies of financial, input, and output valuation.  The USDE has 
proposed a composite rating system that would compare similar institutions 
based on their access, affordability, and outcomes.268  As of the writing of 
this Note, the USDE is soliciting feedback from industry experts as to 
which factors it should consider in measuring “quality.”269 
Government’s venture into school ratings has troubled some industry 
experts.  Some fear that this rating system will focus too much on 
outcomes, thus discounting schools that produce public servants, teachers, 
and military members who earn less money but provide a significant social 
benefit.270 
Debate over the comprehensive rating system and the varying opinions 
for measuring “quality” education evince a tension in the higher education 
industry:  how do you enforce accountability among higher education 
institutions and accreditors if you cannot agree on an intended outcome?271 
III.  THE FUNDING-ACCREDITATION DILEMMA & PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
Analyzed in light of the economic theories discussed in Part II of this 
Note, the accreditation industry and federal student loan program discussed 
in Part I are fraught with structural flaws.  Part III first discusses the 
funding-accreditation dilemma in general.  It then addresses the principal-
agent relationship that exists between the government and accreditors.  
Finally, it considers five proposed solutions to remedy the principal-agent 
problem and structural flaws of the accreditation-federal funding system. 
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 268. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., supra note 251. 
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 270. See id.; see also BURKE & BUTLER, supra note 92, at 2 (suggesting that “federal 
scorecards” be avoided to allow market forces to determine quality). 
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A.  The Funding-Accreditation Dilemma Generally 
Accreditation was formerly a voluntary process used to ensure the quality 
of higher education through a peer-review process that allowed schools to 
distinguish themselves and earn public trust.272  When the government tied 
accreditation to federal funding, using accreditation as a “proxy for 
quality,” it made accreditation a de facto requirement for all institutions.273 
The federal student loan crisis has brought the role of accreditation as a 
primary gatekeeper for federal loans under intense scrutiny.274  Despite 
accreditation’s gatekeeping role, loan balances are skyrocketing, defaults 
are increasing, and students are being overburdened with debt.275 
One of the key reasons accreditation has been ineffective as a gatekeeper 
is because the relationships among the many players in the higher education 
industry generate agency costs.276  The accreditation-federal funding 
system is riddled with conflicts of interest and divergent incentives, 
stemming mostly from conflicting views over how to define a “quality” 
education.277  The government has been increasing its involvement in 
accreditation in an attempt to impose accountability and reduce these 
agency costs.278  However, debate still remains as to whether the 
government has been effective in its attempt to impose accountability or 
whether government involvement in education is limiting institutional 
autonomy. 
B.  Government and Accreditors:  A Principal-Agent Relationship 
In the higher education federal funding system discussed above, a 
principal-agent relationship exists between the government and 
accreditors.279  As discussed in Part II.A of this Note, agency costs exist 
when a principal hires an agent to perform a service and the principal and 
agent (1) have divergent interests and (2) do not have equal access to 
information.280  This section analyzes the divergent incentives and 
information asymmetries between the government and accreditors. 
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The government principal has authorized the agent accreditors to carry 
out quality assurance on its behalf;281 however, these accreditors, 
accountable to many constituents, do not necessarily evaluate schools with 
government interests in mind.282  The “inherent contradictions” between the 
government and accreditors have led to inconsistent standards that 
contribute to the ineffectiveness of accreditation’s gatekeeping.283  The 
government and accrediting bodies have divergent interests with respect to 
the funding-accreditation dilemma:  while the government focuses on 
external accountability, accreditors focus more on quality improvement.284 
The government is focused on accountability and wants to ensure that 
billions of dollars of federal student loans are only distributed to quality 
institutions.285  The USDE’s proposed federal scorecard plan to rate 
colleges reflects the government’s concern with the access, affordability, 
and outcomes of higher education.286  The government’s ultimate concern 
is consumer protection and financial accountability—including loan 
repayment.287  The USDE wants accreditation to play this “consumer 
protection role,” which would involve providing instant information, 
quantitative standards, and bright-line judgments in assessing educational 
quality.288  The government seeks “public confidence, quality, and 
transparency,” rather than the peer-review process that has been the 
hallmark of accreditation.289 
In addition to the government’s interest in controlling the use of its 
federal loans, the government has multiple constituents to which it is 
accountable.290  As discussed in Part II.A.2, government actors in principal-
agent relationships are faced with political pressure, public opinion, and 
lobbyists.291  Thus, the government may be influenced by competing 
pressures to increase college enrollment and lower tuition.292 
While the government is focused on accountability, accrediting bodies 
are focused on assessment and quality improvement.293  Accreditors do not 
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see their role as a consumer protection advocate.294  Accreditors have 
focused on a more nuanced system of quality review that involves working 
with institutions to improve their processes.295  While a consumer 
protection role would require accreditors to be accountable to those outside 
the education industry, the peer-review, self-regulating accreditation 
industry operates as though it is accountable to the higher education 
community.296  Accreditors want to focus on institutional autonomy and 
academic freedom;297 however, regulators pressure accreditors to focus 
more on learning outcomes and standards.298 
The accreditation industry’s interest in the quality of education 
necessarily includes that education be separate from government 
interference.299  Accreditors are concerned that increasing government 
involvement could lead to the USDE acting as a “co-accreditor,” 
challenging accrediting bodies’ decisions and increasing control over the 
assessment process.300 
In addition to quality improvement, accrediting bodies have an interest in 
maintaining collegiality in the higher education industry for both 
reputational and financial reasons.301  First, there is a “high degree of 
collegiality in the [accreditation] process” because teams that evaluate 
schools are generally composed of faculty from other colleges and 
universities in the region—the same colleges and universities that will then 
be accredited by faculty of the school being assessed.302  Reviewing 
committee members often know each other and have a desire to stay on 
good terms with the repeat players in the process.303  Ultimately, these 
reputational concerns incentivize accrediting bodies to approve 
accreditation.304 
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In addition to reputational concerns, financial concerns make collegiality 
a key interest of accreditors.  Accrediting agencies are funded in large part 
by the colleges and universities that pay dues.305  Withdrawing 
accreditation would therefore limit the accrediting agencies’ funds, biasing 
accrediting agencies in favor of approving accreditation.306 
In addition to these divergent interests—public accountability versus 
institutional assessment—there are information asymmetries between 
accreditors and the government.  The accreditors have knowledge about the 
institutions they assess because of the long-term collegial relationships 
formed with these institutions.307  This information is generally not publicly 
available, as accreditors publish limited information about their 
assessments.308  These information asymmetries and divergent interests 
generate agency costs as the government attempts to regulate accreditors. 
C.  Proposals for Reform 
Public debate about the effectiveness of the accreditation process and the 
growing level of student loan debt have led to calls for reform of the 
accreditation-funding relationship.  The government monitors accrediting 
agencies using a number of regulations discussed in Part I.B.4 of this 
Note.309  Though these regulations attempt to align the incentives of 
accrediting bodies and the government and thereby reduce agency costs, 
they are largely ineffective in doing so.310  This section discusses several 
proposals for modifying the accreditation and federal student loan 
system.311 
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1.  Proposal One:  Maintain the Status Quo 
The first proposal is to keep the accreditation and federal funding 
systems functioning as they are today.  Those who feel that the rise in 
student loan debts does not reflect a “crisis” often claim that increased debt 
signals increased investment in the industry.312  If there is no “student loan 
crisis,” there is no need to overhaul the system.  Additionally, proponents of 
the status quo suggest that the market for education is efficient:  students 
can differentiate between high and low quality institutions regardless of 
government or accreditation involvement.313 
2.  Proposal Two:  Change the Pay Structure 
The second proposal is to change the pay structure of the accrediting 
industry to cut the financial ties between higher education institutions and 
the accrediting bodies.  Because higher education institutions pay dues to 
the accrediting bodies of which they are members, accrediting bodies have 
an incentive to continue granting accreditation regardless of academic 
quality.314  Cutting this tie and allowing the government to directly fund 
accreditation could reduce this incentive and make the accrediting bodies 
more accountable to the government. 
3.  Proposal Three:  Define “Quality” Education 
Third, the government could reform the accreditation-funding 
relationship by specifically defining standards for how quality should be 
assessed, increasing government regulation.315  In defining quality, the 
government could employ any of the measures discussed above in Part 
II.B.2. 
One group of proponents for this reform suggests that the government 
impose a common framework of quality assessment on accreditors that ties 
quality to standard learning outcomes or student performance outcomes.316  
This system could dictate how accreditors are to evaluate the institutions 
they accredit. 
Another group of proponents suggest a government definition of quality 
that would supplement the existing accreditation system.  The USDE-
proposed rating system seeks to create this accreditation supplement by 
valuing education based on a number of factors.317 
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4.  Proposal Four:  Encourage Competition Among Accreditors 
The fourth proposal commonly suggested is that the government should 
increase the number of recognized accrediting bodies.318  Recognizing more 
accrediting bodies would break the current “accreditation monopoly.”319  
This would show accreditors that they are not “too big to fail” and 
incentivize them to follow government interests or face losing recognition 
status.320 
5.  Proposal Five:  Decouple Accreditation and Federal Student Loans 
Finally, the fifth proposal for reform is to decouple the accreditation and 
federal funding systems.321  Under this new system, accreditation would 
continue to function as a private assessment tool, while the government 
would provide Title IV funding to higher education institutions of its 
choice, depending on any institutional requirements it may pass. 
Each of these proposals has far-reaching effects on accreditation, the 
government, higher education institutions, and the public.  For the reasons 
discussed in Part IV, decoupling accreditation and federal funding is the 
best solution to address the agency costs that are inherent in the current 
system. 
IV.  DECOUPLING ACCREDITATION AND  
FEDERAL STUDENT LOANS 
The proposed solutions discussed in Part III of this Note attempt to 
remedy the agency costs created by the current federal funding-
accreditation regime.  Of these proposed solutions, decoupling the two 
regimes is the best way to address the agency costs and flaws in the system, 
ultimately returning autonomy to both accreditors and federal lenders. 
Part IV first explains the failure of outcome-based and behavior-based 
governance mechanisms in reducing agency costs.  It then discusses why 
decoupling accreditation and federal funding is the best solution to this 
dilemma. 
A.  The Failure of Outcome-Based and  
Behavior-Based Governance 
As discussed in Part III of this Note, the relationship between the federal 
student loan program and the accreditation industry creates agency costs 
because of the divergent views of how educational quality should be 
measured.322  Agency costs are often reduced using behavior-based or 
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outcome-based governance mechanisms.323  These governance mechanisms 
align the parties’ incentives and increase the principal’s control over the 
agent, ultimately reducing the agent’s self-serving behavior.324 
There are four key factors that assess if behavior-based or outcome-based 
monitoring is effective:  goal conflict, task programmability, outcome 
uncertainty, and outcome measurability.325  Evaluating these four factors in 
the context of the federal funding-accreditation relationship suggests that 
neither behavior-based nor outcome-based governance will be effective in 
reducing agency costs as both forms of governance presuppose a more 
defined goal. 
First, there is a divisive conflict between the federal government and 
accrediting agencies’ goals.326  Though both parties ultimately seek to 
ensure quality education, the parties’ definitions of “quality” are 
incompatible.327  While the government is focused on external 
accountability and the consumer protection role of accreditation, accreditors 
focus on quality improvement and collegiality in the industry.328  These 
conflicting views of accreditation are exacerbated by the compounded 
agency problem:  public opinion, politicians, and lobbyists influence the 
government, while educational institutions influence accreditors, creating a 
web of conflicting interests and loyalties.329  These conflicting goals 
suggest that outcome-based measurement would be a more appropriate 
governance method. 
Second, task programmability also suggests that outcome-based 
evaluations would be more effective than behavior-based governance.  If an 
agent’s behavior cannot be easily specified in advance, behavior-based 
monitoring is unlikely to be effective.330  Here, there are several reasons 
why the task of accreditation is not programmable.  If the government 
dictated the process of accreditation, it would essentially become a 
government function.  Prescribing accreditation would be equivalent to 
defining quality, allowing the government to regulate higher education.331  
This would contradict the tradition of institutional independence that is the 
cornerstone of higher education in the United States.332  Programming the 
task of accreditation would violate these principles, suggesting that 
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behavior-based governance is an inappropriate manner of addressing 
agency costs.333 
Third, a consideration of outcome uncertainty suggests that neither 
outcome-based nor behavior-based monitoring would be effective because 
no outcome has been specified.  If an agent’s work has little connection to 
the desired outcome, behavior-based mechanisms are more appropriate than 
outcome-based governance.334  The government’s desired outcome is 
ensuring that its billions of dollars are invested in quality institutions; 
however “quality” has not been defined.335  In order to measure the extent 
to which quality education depends on accreditors’ actions, there must be a 
generally accepted definition of “quality education.”  For the reasons 
discussed below, it is impossible to measure quality; thus outcome 
uncertainty suggests that neither outcome-based nor behavior-based 
governance would be effective. 
Finally, though an evaluation of goal conflict and task programmability 
suggests that outcome-based governance could reduce agency costs, a 
consideration of outcome measurability shows that these evaluations would 
be impossible.  Similar to outcome uncertainty, outcome measurability 
presupposes that an outcome is defined.  Because the outcome of “quality 
education” is not defined, the outcome is not measurable and outcome-
based governance would be ineffective. 
Ultimately, the four factors above reveal a fundamental flaw underlying 
both outcome-based and behavior-based governance:  we do not know how 
to define or measure a “quality education.”  Any outcome-based 
governance that would tie the agent’s reward to government desired 
outcomes are ineffective because there is no clear desired outcome.  
Similarly, increasing regulation of accreditors’ behaviors and increasing 
oversight fail absent a clear definition of “quality.”336 
As discussed in Part II.B.2, there are several methods of defining and 
measuring educational quality.337  Each method fails to fully capture all 
aspects of quality because the value of education depends entirely on the 
subjective perceptions of the individual.338  There is no inherent objective 
value of education.  Rather, it depends on the student’s hierarchical ranking 
of choices based on their individual circumstances.339  Individuals take a 
number of factors into consideration in determining the value of education:  
financial constraints, existing education level, intended career path, 
personal ideologies, individual preferences for subject matter, etc.  Any 
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standardized value of education for all students would be inaccurate 
because of these individual preferences. 
The subjective nature of educational quality renders both outcome-based 
and behavior-based governance of accrediting bodies ineffective.  In light 
of the agency costs that exist and the ineffectiveness of these controls, the 
government should sever the tie between accreditation and federal funding. 
B.  Decoupling Accreditation and Federal Student Loans 
Amending the HEA to decouple accreditation and federal funding for 
student loans is the most effective means of reducing agency costs and 
student loan burdens.  This section addresses (1) the flaws of the proposals 
for reform mentioned in Part III, (2) the benefits of decoupling the systems, 
and (3) the potential criticisms of this decoupling solution. 
1.  Flawed Proposals for Reform 
The first four proposals discussed in Part III will not solve the principal-
agent dilemma posed by the current federal funding-accreditation 
relationship.  First, those who argue that no changes are necessary believe 
that rising student loan debts do not signal a crisis.340  However, as 
discussed in Part I.A, the unprecedented rise in student loan debt has led to 
increased default rates and higher tuition costs, burdening both individual 
borrowers and the economy as a whole.341  These burdens have ultimately 
made education less accessible, undermining the purpose of the HEA.342  
Therefore, some type of reform of the federal funding-accreditation system 
is necessary. 
The second proposed reform, changing the pay structure, is a method of 
outcome-based governance that seeks to eliminate the conflict of interest 
inherent in the existing fee structure.343  This proposal fails to address two 
concerns:  (1) divergent interests beyond the financial conflict of interest 
and (2) the lack of a defined outcome.  First, while separating the financial 
tie between higher education institutions and accreditors may reduce the 
financial incentives to accredit schools, it does not address the issue of 
collegiality among evaluators or fundamental ideological differences.344  
Second, as previously discussed, this outcome-based monitoring would not 
be effective unless the government conditioned payment on the 
achievement of a defined outcome.345  If the government provided funding 
without tying it to a defined metric, the incentives of the accreditors may 
not change. 
 
 340. See supra notes 66, 85 (discussing the argument that the increase in student loan 
debt is not a crisis or a bubble that could seriously affect the U.S. economy). 
 341. See supra Part I.A.3. 
 342. See supra Part I.A.3. 
 343. See supra notes 305–06 and accompanying text. 
 344. See supra notes 301–06 and accompanying text. 
 345. See supra Part IV.A. 
1944 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
Similarly, the third proposal’s suggestion that the government should 
define quality would not be a successful reform measure.  As discussed 
above, the subjective theory of value and the highly individualized nature of 
educational choices dictate that a single definition of “quality” would be 
arbitrary and fail to capture the costs and benefits of higher education.346 
Finally, while encouraging competition among accreditors is a valuable 
reform, the fourth proposal fails to contend with accreditors’ and the 
government’s divergent interests.347  Increased competition among 
accreditors would break the cartel held by current accreditors.348  
Accreditors would be faced with the threat of losing USDE recognition if 
they did not thoroughly evaluate schools.  However, as discussed above, 
without clear instruction about how the government wants accreditors to 
evaluate schools, this is an empty threat.  Therefore, increasing competition 
among accreditors alone will not solve the agency problem.349 
2.  The Benefits of Decoupling 
Unlike the reform proposals discussed above, severing the ties between 
accreditation and federal funding will solve the principal-agent dilemma 
and encourage transparency in the industry, ultimately helping students 
make informed decisions.  Decoupling accreditation and federal funding 
will (a) serve the government’s and accreditors’ interests while returning 
independence to institutions; (b) encourage innovation in the higher 
education industry; (c) generate competition among accreditors; and 
(d) increase transparency in the industry. 
a.  Fulfilling the Government’s and Accreditors’ Interests 
The divergent interests of the government and accreditors in the federal 
funding-accreditation system have resulted in neither party’s goals being 
accomplished.350  Accreditation, once a badge of quality, has become a de 
facto requirement now that it is linked to federal funding.351  Under the 
current regime, accreditation’s other functions—for instance, easing 
transfer among schools and improving best practices—are inconsequential 
compared to its role as a gatekeeper of federal funds.352  Thus, accreditors’ 
goals of quality assurance and improvement are not being met.  Similarly, 
government interests are not being served under the current regime because 
accreditors are ill suited to the consumer protection role.353 
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Decoupling accreditation and federal funding will restore institutional 
autonomy to both accreditors and the USDE.  First, accreditation, which 
was intended to be a nongovernmental peer-review process, will regain its 
independence from government interference.354  Accreditors will be free to 
evaluate schools using their own criteria and standards for quality.  
Furthermore, the separation would give accreditors the freedom to develop 
more complex evaluation processes; rather than providing a binary “yes or 
no” response to schools, accreditors could create more granular assessment 
of schools and perhaps create a graded system of accreditation.355 
Similarly, decoupling student loans and accreditation would allow the 
government to develop its own system for determining federal student loan 
funding, focusing on its interest in public accountability and consumer 
protection.  The government would have more flexibility once freed of the 
binary gatekeeping accreditation offers.356  The government could 
introduce a form of risk-based pricing, allowing interest rates or volume of 
student loans to vary depending on a school or program’s performance.  By 
separating student loans and accreditation, the government and accreditors 
could create these tailored programs. 
b.  Encouraging Innovation in Higher Education 
In addition to returning institutional autonomy to the USDE and 
accreditors, allowing them to more effectively meet their goals, decoupling 
accreditation and student loans would encourage innovation in the higher 
education industry.  The current accreditation scheme stifles innovation 
because accreditation focuses on traditional business models of higher 
education institutions.357  Therefore, nontraditional higher education, 
including many online or distance programs, have been unable to get 
federal funding.358  By separating accreditation and student loans, the 
government could encourage diversity in the education industry.  Less 
expensive models of education could be developed to compete with the 
traditional models.  Because each student values education subjectively, 
these nontraditional models may be a more appropriate fit for some 
students.359 
c.  Generating Competition Among Accreditors 
Third, if the government removes itself from the accreditation process, 
there would be more competition within the accreditation industry.  The 
current system, which emphasizes the role of accreditation in the federal 
loan system, values those accreditors that have received USDE 
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recognition.360  This recognition process blocks new accreditors from 
entering the industry in several ways.  First, the existing recognized 
accreditors act as a barrier to entry in that they have reputations for 
credibility.361  Additionally, in order to receive USDE recognition, 
accreditors must have two years of experience accrediting schools.362  
Given the existing accreditors’ entrenchment in the higher education 
industry, this requirement is difficult to meet. 
If the government played no role in the accreditation process, more 
accreditors could enter the industry.  These accreditors, faced with 
increased competition, would be forced to demonstrate to the public that 
they add value to the education industry.  In distinguishing themselves from 
their competitors, these accreditors would be incentivized to make their 
processes public, which is discussed further below. 
d.  Increasing Transparency in the Industry 
Finally, decoupling accreditation and the federal student loan program 
would increase transparency in both the higher education and student loan 
industries, allowing students to make more informed choices about higher 
education and loans.  Separating the loan and accreditation process would 
create two separate systems that provide students with two different types 
of information. 
First, the government lender would provide information in the consumer 
protection role, providing financial data about particular schools and loan 
choices.363  Second, the accrediting agencies would continue to assess 
schools at a more granular level, focusing on more intangible indications of 
“quality.”  These accreditors, competing against potential new accreditors 
in the industry, would have an incentive to disclose the methods they use to 
assess quality, including the metrics and results that are typically kept 
confidential.364 
Both the financial information collected by the government lender and 
the more intangible assessments conducted by accreditors provide students 
with information to help inform their choice of education and financing.  
Rather than simply telling students that a school is accredited and thus 
eligible for funding, a decoupled regime would provide more detailed 
information.  Students with more information can make more rational 
decisions about which schools to attend and which type and amount of loan 
to choose, based on their subjective value determinations. 
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3.  Criticisms of Decoupling 
Despite the benefits of decoupling discussed above, critics of this plan 
may argue that it could lead to (a) a new bureaucracy, (b) the elimination of 
accreditation, and (c) government funding being diverted to the “wrong” 
schools.  While decoupling accreditation and federal student loans would 
effect major changes in the higher education industry, each of these 
criticisms overstates the negative consequences of such a change. 
a.  Creating a New Bureaucracy 
First, critics may argue that once the government is no longer relying on 
accreditation to assess quality, it will form a new bureaucracy faced with 
the same dilemma of determining which schools should receive federal 
funding.  The USDE’s proposed federal scorecards, a composite rating 
system, suggest that the government is already moving towards creating its 
own requirements for funding.365 
While decoupling accreditation and student loans will force the 
government to make independent decisions about which schools and 
programs it will fund, the government can do so without creating a new 
bureaucracy.  The government is a lender for student loans, and should base 
its requirements for these loans on statistical data that indicates if the loans 
will be repaid, avoiding pedagogical judgments.  Market forces and public 
opinion will assess the quality of a school’s educational program, so there 
will be no need for a bureaucracy to grade or rate educational quality. 
b.  Eliminating the Role of Accreditation 
Critics may further argue that allowing the government to create its own 
standards for student loans would essentially eliminate the need for 
accreditation.  While accreditors would be faced with increased competition 
and would perhaps be forced to change their behaviors, they would not 
necessarily be rendered useless.  Accreditation serves many purposes 
beyond its gatekeeping role:  assisting institutions with self-improvement, 
engendering public confidence, enabling students to transfer among 
schools, and creating standards for professional degrees.366  Accreditation 
would continue to serve these purposes even if the process was independent 
from the federal loan system, as it was for decades before the enactment of 
the GI Bill.367 
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c.  Funding the “Wrong” Schools 
Finally, some critics may fear that under a decoupled regime, accredited 
schools may not receive funding while unaccredited schools continue to be 
funded.  If federal student loans are independent of accreditation, schools 
will fall into one of four categories:  (1) accredited with funding, 
(2) unaccredited without funding, (3) accredited without funding, and 
(4) unaccredited with funding.  Though the first two categories are the same 
as under the current federal funding-accreditation system, the third and 
fourth categories present unique situations. 
First, this decoupling solution may result in a group of accredited but 
unfunded institutions.368  Because many institutions rely on federal student 
loans, these institutions may be forced to close despite their accredited 
status.369  However, this criticism fails to consider alternative funding 
options.  A shrinking public student loans market would incentivize 
students to look to the private student loan market.370  Additionally, these 
schools would be encouraged to change their behavior to entice students to 
attend.  They could increase scholarships, lower tuition rates, or create new 
payment programs for students.  The government should not fund risky 
loans with little hope of being repaid simply because an institution has been 
accredited. 
The second potential new category of schools under a decoupled regime 
would be unaccredited institutions receiving federal funding for student 
loans.  Given the subjective nature of “quality education,”371 however, the 
government should focus on its role as a lender regardless of the 
institution’s accreditation status.  The government should allow the private 
market to assess a school’s quality, and base its lending decisions on more 
objective criteria.  Additionally, as discussed above, providing student loan 
funding to unaccredited schools could foster innovation in the higher 
education industry. 
CONCLUSION 
The relationship between the student loan program and accreditation 
contributes to the growing student loan crisis.  In this relationship, the 
government and accreditors have divergent interests:  the government is 
concerned with consumer protection and ensuring that its loans are 
distributed to “quality institutions,” while accreditors focus on long-term 
“quality” improvement and collegiality.  The government’s attempt to align 
these incentives through increased control over the accreditation industry 
has been ineffective because these regulations require a definition of 
“quality” education.  The highly individualized nature of educational 
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choices and the subjective theory of value dictate that any single definition 
of “quality” would be arbitrary and fail to capture the true value of 
education. 
Amending the HEA to decouple federal student loans and accreditation 
would allow the government and accreditors to develop their own methods 
of evaluating higher education institutions.  In addition to eliminating the 
agency problem, severing the tie between these two programs would 
increase the amount of information available in the market, allowing 
students to make more rational subjective decisions about their education 
and finances.  This increased transparency, combined with a more prudent 
federal student loan program, would ultimately help reduce the effects of 
the student loan crisis. 
 
